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execUtIVe sUmmARY |
Young offenders face a wide range of individual, family, and environmental 
obstacles. determining the best response to any one youth requires a 
customized program of prevention, rehabilitation, and public safety resources. 
the city of chicago’s Juvenile Intervention and support center (JIsc) uses 
a collaborative approach to providing services and supports for youth from 
several south side neighborhoods.1  Young people are taken to the JIsc by 
police for screening and assessment and to be either: (1) diverted and sent 
home, (2) “station adjusted” and referred to case management services, or (3) 
moved on for juvenile justice processing. 
to the extent that the JIsc represents a new approach for dealing with young 
offenders in chicago, the non-diverted, station-adjusted youth referred 
to case management are its primary clients. such youth have often been 
arrested for delinquent offenses, or they have been referred to the JIsc as a 
result of technical violations (e.g., failure to appear in court). Police officials 
offer the youth station adjustments and case management because their 
current offenses and prior records do not merit prosecution, but they do 
appear to need some type of intervention. As long as they cooperate with 
case managers and complete a program of voluntary services and activities, 
they can avoid further involvement with the justice system. 
the chicago JIsc is similar to programs in other jurisdictions, often called 
“juvenile assessment centers.” Before implementing the JIsc, chicago officials 
researched the concept of juvenile assessment centers and visited programs 
around the country, including the original centers in Florida. the city officials 
hoped to design a process that would ensure an effective response for young 
offenders, while keeping as many youth as appropriate from becoming 
ensnared in the justice system. several strategies for community intervention 
and youth services were central in the development of the JIsc. the most 
essential frameworks included: (1) early intervention, (2) interagency service 
coordination, (3) graduated sanctioning, (4) community justice and problem-
solving justice, (5) restorative justice, and (6) positive youth development. 
one year after the JIsc opened its doors, and with funding from the John d. 
and catherine t. macArthur Foundation, the city of chicago asked researchers 
to review the operations of the JIsc and to conduct a process evaluation of 
its policies and practices. one of the main goals of the study was to assess 
the readiness of the JIsc for a more detailed outcome or impact evaluation. 
during 2007 and 2008, researchers visited the JIsc numerous times, 
reviewed an assortment of documents and reports about the program, and 
interviewed a wide range of individuals involved in its design, operation, and 
management. 
the study focused on issues identified by previous research on juvenile 
assessment centers, including program funding, design and target 
population, agency partnerships, governance and staffing, and data systems 
and policies governing the sharing of client information. In addition, the 
researchers explored whatever topics were suggested by their interviews with 
local officials.
1 this report uses the present tense to describe the operations of the chicago JIsc, but readers are 
advised that the research was conducted between 2007 and 2009 and some aspects of the
program have likely changed. 
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 Based on their review, the study team came to the following conclusions:  
 >  By the third year of operation, the JIsc was seen as a successful program. many 
administrative challenges had been met through the leadership of city officials. 
the long-term success of the program, however, depended on its ability to deliver 
meaningful services and supports for youth and families. 
 
>  Unlike juvenile assessment centers in other cities, which have sometimes lapsed 
into simple referral mechanisms for providers in the mental health and drug 
treatment sectors, the chicago JIsc was built around the concepts of restorative 
justice and positive youth development. this innovative approach was one of the 
best features of the JIsc but also one of its biggest challenges. 
 
>  to fulfill its core mission, the JIsc required a broad menu of services, supports, and 
opportunities for youth and families. many of these resources cannot be purchased 
from professional service providers. they come into existence only through the 
recruitment and organization of individual volunteers, neighborhood groups, and 
allied partners, including small-business owners and the faith community. the city 
needed to invest in these efforts if the JIsc was to succeed over the long term. 
 
>  the success of the JIsc also depended on the city’s continued management of 
the inevitable incompatibilities between police and social services. their different 
views regarding the issues facing at-risk youth and the most effective solutions for 
those issues had to be handled on an ongoing basis.  
 
>  even three years into operation, serious disputes remained over the mission of 
the JIsc and the potential it had to “widen the net” of intervention by bringing 
non-serious offenders into the justice system, but the partner agencies aired these 
disputes successfully, and it was unlikely that such problems would go unnoticed 
in the future.
 
>  the administrative structure and information management capacity of the JIsc 
appeared to be sufficient for the program to participate in a future outcome 
evaluation. 
  
>  the primary challenge facing the JIsc was the lack of depth and diversity in the 
resources it was able to offer to youth and families.
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IntRodUctIon |
Juveniles arrested for criminal violations are not a single, homogenous 
group. they face a wide range of individual, family, and environmental 
obstacles, and they would benefit from varying sanctions, services, and 
supports. determining the best response to an individual youth cannot be 
the sole responsibility of public safety officials. law enforcement agencies are 
concerned with public safety and the severity of criminal behavior, but most 
youth arrested by police have not committed, and may never commit, serious 
or violent crimes. Among juvenile arrests in chicago in 2005, for example, the 
top five offenses were drug-abuse violations, simple battery, various non-
Index offenses (e.g., criminal trespass), disorderly conduct, and larceny-theft 
(Herdegen 2006). A youth’s involvement in such behavior might be a relatively 
harmless mistake made by a still-developing adolescent, or it could be the 
first sign of trouble by a future career criminal. How are the police and the 
courts to distinguish among these possibilities? 
the chicago Juvenile Intervention and support center (JIsc) is an attempt 
to bring greater consistency to such decisions. the JIsc provides preventive 
services and supports to young people from chicago’s south side 
neighborhoods. Youth selected by the JIsc for case management services 
have been arrested for delinquent offenses or technical violations, such as 
failure to appear in court. they are usually young first-time or second-time 
offenders, and as long as they voluntarily complete a program of services and 
activities, they can avoid further involvement with the justice system and the 
stigma of adjudication. 
 
After a lengthy process of planning and program development, the JIsc 
opened its doors to clients in march 2006. one year later, the city of chicago, 
with funding from the John d. and catherine t. macArthur Foundation, 
invited researchers to conduct a process evaluation of the program. the goal 
of a process evaluation is to document the conceptualization, design, and 
operations of a program. Process evaluations help social programs prepare 
for outcome evaluations that measure their effectiveness and success with 
clients. during 2007 and 2008, researchers visited the JIsc numerous times, 
reviewed documents and reports about the program, and interviewed a wide 
range of individuals. Interviews were conducted with the leaders and staff 
of public agencies, including the office of the mayor of the city of chicago, 
the chicago Police department, the chicago department of children and 
Youth services, the chicago Public schools, the cook county circuit court, 
the state’s Attorney’s office for cook county, the office of the cook county 
Public defender, the cook county Juvenile Probation department, and the 
Illinois criminal Justice Information Authority. Interviews were also conducted 
with private, nongovernmental organizations, including the sinai community 
Institute and the community Justice for Youth Institute.
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| PRogRAm settIng
chicago’s Juvenile Intervention and support center (JIsc) is a pre-court 
diversion program that provides preventive services and supports for “station 
adjusted” (informally handled) youthful offenders. Police officials offer station 
adjustments to youth whose current offense and prior record do not seem to 
merit prosecution and referral to juvenile court. By successfully completing 
the voluntary services provided through the JIsc and by keeping out of 
trouble with the police, a young person has an opportunity to avoid the stain 
of adjudication and a chance to grow up without the burden of a court record. 
the chicago JIsc serves youth from the regions of the city designated 
by the chicago Police department as districts 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21. these 
communities on chicago’s south side contain numerous thriving and diverse 
neighborhoods, but they also include some of the most distressed areas 
of the city, including north lawndale, englewood, Pilsen, and little Village. 
According to the chicago Police department, the total population in the 
communities served by the JIsc was nearly 800,000 as of 2006. Residents of 
these areas reported more than 40,000 crimes that were serious enough to 
be counted in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime Index, including 
145 homicides, 507 criminal sexual assaults, and 4,702 robberies. of course, 
the vast majority of these crimes were committed by adults, but the scope of 
offending suggests that juveniles in these neighborhoods are likely to face 
severe obstacles and risks. 
launched by the city of chicago in 2006, the Juvenile Intervention and 
support center is an attempt to create a new approach to justice for the 
city’s young people. the JIsc is a multiagency collaboration involving law 
enforcement agencies, juvenile probation officials, prosecutors, children and 
youth services, public schools, health care providers, neighborhoods, and 
families. 
 
Youth and families have their first contacts with the JIsc at a facility on 
chicago’s south side, but the JIsc is not a building. It is a process. the goal 
of the process is to identify delinquent youth as soon as possible after they 
begin to violate the law and to implement services and supports that lower 
the chances of future crime. 
> juvenile intervention 
and support center 
3900 South California Street
Chicago, Illinois
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the JIsc responds to the delinquent acts of chicago teens to prevent their 
further involvement with the juvenile justice system. It does this by assessing 
the circumstances of each youth and family and, where appropriate, involving 
them in a case management process that identifies services they may need 
(e.g., family counseling, drug and alcohol treatment, and anger management). 
Beyond services and treatment, however, the JIsc process tries to connect 
youth with positive supports and activities that might prevent them from 
committing additional crimes. case managers work to engage each youth and 
family in an array of resources that provide positive experiences, including 
physical activity and sports, educational assistance, training and employment 
connections, participation in civic or community affairs, and experience with 
forms of personal expression such as music and the arts. 
According to officials from one of the key partners in the JIsc, the chicago 
department of children and Youth services (cYs), the JIsc process was 
designed to create more effective interventions in the following ways:
>  Identifying and leveraging the strengths and capabilities of youth and families 
 
>  encouraging youth and families to assume responsibility for their futures and to 
take control of their lives 
 
< juvenile arrests: 
chicago police districts
Source: 
Juvenile Arrest Trends—2000-2005. 
Chicago Police Department, Research and 
Development Division, June 2006.
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>  Actively involving families and community members in all aspects of service 
planning and delivery; ensuring that families have access, voice, and ownership 
 
>  working with youth at the times of day when most delinquent acts occur (i.e., after 
school and early evening) 
 
>  Revising strategies rather than blaming clients
 
>  linking youth with opportunities and supports in addition to services
 
>  linking families with services, supports, and opportunities that are appropriate for 
their specific needs 
 
>  developing new resources when existing resources are inadequate
 
>  developing individualized discharge plans after consulting with youth and family 
members 
 
>  ensuring that supports are in place to sustain the family after discharge
 
>  monitoring the effectiveness of JIsc efforts and enhancing statistical information 
with input from families
Prior to the opening of the JIsc, approximately 8,000 juveniles were arrested 
each year in the neighborhoods served by the program. some offenses were 
serious enough to warrant immediate referral to the cook county juvenile 
court system. others were best handled within the family without any further 
contact with law enforcement or social services. many arrests, however, fell 
between the two extremes. they were serious enough to merit intervention, 
but not serious enough to warrant formal justice involvement. the in-
between cases were the main reason the city of chicago launched the JIsc. 
city officials estimated that 2,000 of the youth arrested each year in the areas 
served by the JIsc would be appropriate for the preventive services offered by 
the JIsc, if there were sufficient resources available to meet their needs.
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stUdY APPRoAcH |
A process evaluation is not an outcome evaluation. An outcome evaluation 
is used to test whether a program produces the client outcomes it says it 
does. A process evaluation documents how a program conducts its day-
to-day business. It assesses the conceptualization, design, delivery, and 
measurement of client interventions before those interventions are subjected 
to a more rigorous outcome evaluation. to employ the medical metaphor 
of treatment dosage and patient response, it could be said that a process 
evaluation investigates whether a treatment is being delivered as intended, 
while an outcome evaluation tests whether patients get better after receiving 
treatment. 
to prepare for an outcome evaluation, the JIsc must be able to measure 
the intensity of services for each youth and family and to assess the fidelity 
of each service plan. In other words, do the services and supports offered 
through the JIsc make sense, given the program’s expressed “theory 
of change” (i.e., that young offenders respond best to early, informal 
interventions that are consistent with restorative justice and positive youth 
development)? 
to participate in an outcome evaluation, the JIsc would need to be capable of 
generating detailed, individual-level data about screening, case management, 
and referral as well as subsequent service contacts, the duration of services, 
and the diversity of services for each youth, including the extent to which 
each youth and family participates in the various opportunities and supports 
managed directly by the JIsc, its contractors, or other community-based 
groups. For an outcome evaluation, the program would need to produce 
long-term youth outcome measures (e.g., the prevalence of new arrests or 
new court contacts in the 12, 18, or 24 months following JIsc intervention). 
A process evaluation is helpful in establishing whether these necessary 
data elements can be collected reliably and consistently, and whether the 
same data elements could be available for a suitable comparison group. In 
a process evaluation, researchers ask critical questions about a program’s 
activities and the availability of important data. Before a process evaluation 
is completed, this information is rarely available. even senior program 
officials are usually not able to answer key questions in enough detail to 
allow a researcher to ascertain whether a program is ready to engage in an 
outcome evaluation. without an effective process evaluation, an outcome 
evaluation would be unlikely to generate findings that would be considered 
conclusive. even the most sophisticated statistical techniques cannot make 
up for an evaluation design that fails to measure service intensity accurately. 
Unless service intensity can be monitored, a program is simply a “black box” 
of undifferentiated causes that may or may not be related to a program’s 
expected effects, even if those effects (e.g., behavior change) may appear 
impressive out of context.
PRocess eVAlUAtIons VeRsUs mAnAgement stUdIes 
the tasks and activities required for a process evaluation are similar to those 
used in management studies. Both investigations involve the collection of 
program documents, interviews with program staff, and an examination of 
data systems. 
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their purposes, however, are quite different. the goal of a management study 
is to answer questions about the efficiency of an organization’s business 
practices. these questions might include the following:
 >  does the agency have effective leadership?
 >  does the agency have appropriately trained staff?
 >  does the agency demonstrate effective communication, internally and externally?
 
 >  Are the partners and subcontractors involved with the agency appropriate, and do 
they have the skills and capacities necessary to perform? 
 >  does the agency have sound contracts or memoranda of agreement to establish 
an appropriate division of labor with its key partners? 
 
>  does the agency have mechanisms in place to track expenditures? 
 
>  Is the information system adequate to maintain core operations?
these questions are about the effectiveness of agency operations and the 
organization’s administrative acumen. they do not address the impact 
of agency efforts on clients, nor do they generate information about the 
appropriateness of the program’s basic approach. An agency could be 
expertly administered but ineffective due to shortcomings in its theory of 
change. A program based on a bad or misplaced theory of change might be 
operated efficiently but fail to have a measurable impact on outcomes.
 to use an extreme (and even silly) example, an agency could assert that the 
best method of reducing youth recidivism is to teach all young offenders how 
to play poker. the program might be run quite efficiently. It might provide 
all youth with playing cards, chips, and betting instructions, and it might 
do so in a very cost-effective manner, using trained staff and well-managed 
contractors. someone, however, eventually has to ask the question, “does 
poker playing really reduce recidivism?” the task of an evaluator is to answer 
that question with statistical precision. 
A management study may address the client-related processes of an agency, 
but it does so in a descriptive way. Investigators in management studies 
usually accept the reports of agency officials at face value. when a program 
manager describes the range of services provided to clients, it is often beyond 
the scope of a management study to test the accuracy of the description. A 
process evaluation, on the other hand, is explicitly designed to investigate the 
accuracy of normative program descriptions, because the central goal of the 
process evaluation is to measure program activities as they really are, rather 
than as agency leaders would like to characterize them.  
metHods Used In tHe stUdY
In 2007 and 2008, researchers met with the chicago Police department, 
children and Youth services, and JIsc staff to discuss the general plan of the 
process evaluation. they toured the facility several times and were introduced 
to the components of case processing—intake, screening, and case 
management. Interviews were conducted with various individuals identified 
by the research team or through referrals made during interviews. each of the 
following people was interviewed at least once during the study. 
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(note: the affiliations listed were accurate at the time of the study interviews.)
 > John Adams, sinai community Institute
 > megan Alderden, chicago Police department 
 > kathleen Bankhead, Juvenile Justice division, cook county state’s Attorney
 
> mary ellen caron, chicago department of children and Youth services
 
> ginny caufield, Balanced and Restorative Justice, cook county Juvenile court
 
> cathy kolb, chicago Police department
 
> evelyn R. cole, sinai community Institute 
 
> earl dunlap, cook county Juvenile temporary detention center 
 
> cheryl graves, community Justice for Youth Institute
 
> Robert Hargesheimer, chicago Police department
 
> errol Hicks, chicago Police department
 
> lori levin, Illinois criminal Justice Information Authority
 
> christopher mallette, chicago department of children and Youth services
 
> mike masters, office of the mayor
 
> mark myrent, Illinois criminal Justice Information Authority
 
> Jim mccarter, Juvenile Justice division, cook county state’s Attorney
 
> Peter newman, county circuit court
 
> Azim Ramelize, chicago department of children and Youth services 
 
> Judith Rocha, sinai community Institute
 
> mike Rohan, Juvenile Probation and court services, cook county Juvenile court
 
> Angela Rudolph, office of the mayor
 
> larry sachs, chicago Police department
 
> steven terrell, chicago Police department
 
> dianne thompson, chicago Police department
 
> cynthia williams, sinai community Institute
 
> Paula wolff, chicago metropolis 2020
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the researchers also reviewed a wide range of documents from the JIsc and 
from the various agencies involved in its development. these documents 
included reports, meeting notes, interagency memoranda, intake and 
screening forms, outreach material describing the program and outlining 
its mission, newsletters, pamphlets on services offered, flow charts, arrest 
report forms, station adjustment forms (formal and informal), victim-offender 
conferencing paperwork, counseling referral forms, peer jury paperwork, sinai 
community Institute spreadsheets, and a guide on balanced and restorative 
justice.  Finally, researchers reviewed various management information 
systems used by the chicago Police department, the sinai community 
Institute, the chicago department of children and Youth services, and the 
JIsc itself to understand what information was collected on youth and what 
role such information played (and was intended to play) in the operation of 
the center and the processing of individual cases.
14 | | 15
tHe JIsc PRocess |
when a young person arrives at the JIsc building on south california street 
in chicago, he or she has probably just been apprehended and/or arrested 
by chicago Police department (cPd) officers and taken to the JIsc by car. 
escorted by patrol officers, the youth enters the JIsc building through a side 
door adjacent to the parking lot. while one of the arresting officers fills out an 
arrest report and other required paperwork, the youth is most likely secured 
with handcuffs to a booking bench, a wooden bench that is bolted to the 
floor and the wall. After 30 to 60 minutes, the patrol officer leaves the JIsc, 
and the youth is escorted to the second floor of the building to be finger-
printed and photographed. the youth then waits in a secure area of the JIsc, 
which is a small waiting room with ceiling-mounted fluorescent lights, hard 
plastic furniture, and a large plexiglass window that allows cPd officers to ob-
serve the waiting youth. the room has nothing else in it. there are no reading 
materials and no television. Youth are required to remain seated unless given 
permission to stand or move.  
they youth may wait in the secure area for an hour or even several hours, 
depending on the time of day and the backlog of cases in need of further 
processing. At some point, a detective comes to take the youth to an office to 
begin the intake process. the intake detective asks a series of questions while 
filling out an assessment form that organizes the facts pertinent to the intake 
decision. during the interview, the detective notes the situation surrounding 
the youth’s arrest, the severity of the offense, the youth’s criminal background, 
and whether any warrants exist from previous arrests.  
the assessment form provides an easy way to list the information gathered 
from name checks, arrest reports, and the computer check. Felonies and 
misdemeanors are listed separately to assess each youth’s criminal history. the 
officer then assigns a risk level by checking or not checking a series of boxes 
that characterize the youth’s arrest history. Using the assessment form, the of-
ficer has the discretion to determine if the youth poses a low, medium, or high 
risk. the tally of the assessment form is not absolute, but if an officer decides 
to handle the case in a way that is not consistent with the results of the as-
sessment form, the decision must be reported and explained to a supervisor. 
In cases involving serious offenses or multiple prior offenses, youth may be 
transferred to secure detention. If detention is not considered appropriate, 
but the youth has been charged with relatively serious offenses or has an 
extensive arrest record, the case will likely be referred to juvenile court for 
further legal processing. the remaining youth, the non-detained and non-
referred cases, are eligible for station adjustment and case management 
services. 
A station-adjusted youth who is referred to case management has to wait 
once again in the secure area on the second floor of the JIsc building until 
a parent or guardian arrives and consents to meet with staff from the sinai 
community Institute (scI). the officers try to accommodate the youth if he or 
she needs to use the restroom or becomes hungry; however, no activities are 
provided. one cPd officer, when asked about the stark environment of the 
waiting area, endorsed its punitive qualities, stating that “we have to let them 
know that when they’re arrested, there are certain rights they lose. Remember 
how this feels so that next time you won’t do what you did to come in here.”  
| 15
After the parent or guardian arrives, a cPd officer brings the youth to the 
first floor of the building and speaks with the family in an office off the lobby. 
the officer describes the arrest  and then explains that the juvenile is being 
adjusted and referred to case management rather than facing formal charges 
and a court hearing. A worker from the case management agency, scI, meets 
with the youth and parent, explains case management, and invites the parent 
to consent to the program. If the parent refuses, the cPd detective returns 
and explains that the matter will be referred to the state’s Attorney’s office. 
If the parent or guardian consents to the station adjustment and agrees to 
participate in case management, the scI worker begins to interview the youth 
and parent and conducts additional assessments in order to prepare an indi-
vidualized family service plan. At that point, the cPd officers are finished with 
the case. officers keep track of how long youth are at the JIsc (when they en-
ter the building, when they go upstairs, when they enter and leave the secure 
area, and when they leave the JIsc with a parent). Ideally, the entire process is 
completed within six hours. 
If a youth and family cooperate with scI and successfully complete the goals 
of the service plan, their case will be closed. some families, however, agree to 
cooperate but then walk out of the JIsc building and disappear. clearly, some 
people who pick up youth from the JIsc never intend to complete the service 
plan; they just want to get out of the JIsc building as quickly as possible. 
 
After three follow-up calls and two unannounced home visits, the case 
management staff at scI sends a certified letter to the family saying that their 
continued lack of cooperation has resulted in the matter being returned to 
the police and the state’s Attorney’s office. the scI staff member fills out a 
form explaining why the case should be closed. An scI social worker reviews 
the form and passes it on to the director for review, at which point the case 
is closed. when a family fails to follow through with scI, the police depart-
ment notifies the cook county state’s Attorney’s office, and a prosecutor may 
decide to reinstate the original charges against the youth, in keeping with the 
deferred prosecution procedures agreed upon by the state’s Attorney’s office 
and city officials.  
 
If a youth and famIly 
cooperate wIth ScI and 
SucceSSfully complete 
the goalS of the ServIce 
plan, theIr caSe wIll be 
cloSed.
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concePtUAl PRecURsoRs |
Before implementing the JIsc, a number of chicago officials researched 
the concept of juvenile assessment centers and visited other programs 
around the country. the city hoped to design a process that would ensure 
an effective response for young offenders while maintaining vigorous 
diversion standards. several strategies for community intervention and youth 
services were central in the development of the chicago JIsc. the most 
essential frameworks include (1) early intervention, (2) interagency service 
coordination, (3) graduated sanctioning, (4) community justice and problem-
solving justice, (5) restorative justice, and (6) positive youth development.  
eARlY InteRVentIon
the JIsc was designed to achieve a basic but often neglected goal of juvenile 
justice—to respond immediately and effectively to a youth’s first delinquent 
acts in order to prevent future crime and avoid the costs of repeated 
delinquency. members of the public often believe that early intervention is a 
principal function of the juvenile justice system, but it is actually rare for large 
cities to pursue early intervention seriously. the first, second, or even third 
delinquent act by a young person is often ignored by juvenile authorities. 
one reason for this apparent lack of action is that a vast majority of youth 
engage in at least some illegal behavior before adulthood. In fact, one in 
three juveniles commits at least one serious act of property crime or violence 
before age 18 (thornberry and krohn 2003:100–101). Responding formally 
to all instances of delinquent behavior would be extremely expensive. 
thus, the justice system refrains from taking action until a youth exhibits 
persistent delinquency. Another reason why justice officials often fail to act 
in response to a first criminal violation is that bringing youth into the juvenile 
justice system is risky. the stigma and negative self-identity associated with 
legal sanctions may cause youth to engage in more illegal behavior, not 
less (Bernburg and krohn 2003). Because of this risk, as well as the need to 
maintain sound public policy regarding diversion from the justice system, it is 
important to avoid drawing youth into the legal system unnecessarily. 
due to these legitimate concerns, most communities wait to intervene 
aggressively with delinquent youth until they have been arrested several 
times. At most, first-time offenders may be offered informal, noncoercive 
referrals to social service agencies. this is rarely effective, however, because of 
a third reason why communities fail to intervene at the onset of delinquency: 
most communities simply have very little to offer youth and families in 
need of preventive services and supports, especially the type of resources 
that would be accepted and used by voluntary clients. lacking an array 
of appealing resources, communities usually fail to intervene during the 
formation of delinquent behavior. Yet, this is probably when intervention 
is most effective. the best time to intervene in any antisocial or destructive 
behavior is early, as soon as it appears. Arguing for early intervention is easy; 
implementing it is hard.
InteRAgencY cooRdInAtIon
In the past decade, jurisdictions across the United states have tried to increase 
cross-agency coordination. the chronic absence of effective coordination 
among service agencies has long been one of the most potent barriers to 
preventing and reducing juvenile crime (Howell 1995; Rivers, dembo, and 
the JISc waS deSIgned 
to achIeve a baSIc but 
often neglected goal 
of JuvenIle JuStIce—to 
reSpond ImmedIately 
and effectIvely to a 
youth’S fIrSt delInquent 
actS In order to prevent 
future crIme and avoId 
the coStS of repeated 
delInquency. 
| 17
Anwyl 1998; lipsey and wilson 1998; lipsey 1999; cocozza and skowyra 
2000; slayton 2000; Jenson and Potter 2003). traditionally, human services 
agencies were established to provide specific programs (e.g., substance use/
abuse intervention, sex offender treatment, education support, mental health 
treatment), and each agency worked individually with its own particular client 
population. the resulting interventions were often inefficient and ineffective, 
and jurisdictions found it difficult to identify and work with youth who 
presented co-occurring disorders involving mental health problems, family 
problems, substance abuse, educational deficits, and other social problems 
(Peters and Bartoi 1997; Peters and Hills 1997). In response, many states made 
intra- and interagency collaboration a priority (national criminal Justice 
Association 1997; Rivers and Anwyl 2000).
gRAdUAted sAnctIons
the operative philosophy of the JIsc is also consistent with the graduated 
sanctions approach (Howell 1995). grounded in both research and 
common sense, graduated sanctioning ensures that there is at least some 
response to each instance of illegal behavior as juveniles begin to violate 
the law. Jurisdictions that embrace this approach develop a full continuum 
of sanctions, including immediate sanctions for first-time offenders, 
intermediate and community-based sanctions for more serious offenders, 
and secure/residential placement for those youth who commit especially 
serious or violent offenses. such approaches can introduce a greater degree of 
consistency in how youth within and across jurisdictions are sanctioned. more 
important, they can promote justice solutions that rely on the demonstrated 
effectiveness of rehabilitation and treatment, and that emphasize 
responsiveness, accountability, and responsibility as the cornerstones of an 
effective juvenile justice system. 
commUnItY JUstIce And PRoBlem-solVIng JUstIce
many components of the juvenile justice system have begun to adopt the 
framework of “community justice” and “problem-solving justice.” community 
justice refocuses the nature of justice-system intervention. each incidence 
of criminal behavior is viewed within the context of the community in 
which it occurs. Professionals within the justice system work to develop 
relationships with community leaders and other residents to understand 
why crime happens and to prevent future occurrences. these concepts have 
inspired several important program innovations in the criminal justice system, 
including community policing, community prosecution, and community 
courts (Rottman and casey 1999; connor 2000; karp and clear 2000). 
Problem-solving justice is an old idea in the juvenile justice system, but in 
recent years it has become a compelling framework in criminal justice as 
well. Rather than simply identifying offenders, weighing the evidence against 
them, and imposing punishment, the problem-solving perspective calls upon 
the justice system to use the processes of investigation, arrest, prosecution, 
and sentencing to solve problems in the community. this shifts the focus of 
the justice system to the well-being of families and communities instead of 
the culpability of offenders. 
Problem solving has long been the mission of the juvenile justice system and 
one of the key reasons for the development of juvenile assessment centers. 
one influential statement in support of community justice and problem-
solving justice was made more than a decade ago by two administrators for 
the federal office of Juvenile Justice and delinquency Prevention. 
problem SolvIng haS 
long been the mISSIon 
of the JuvenIle JuStIce 
SyStem and one of 
the key reaSonS for 
the development of 
JuvenIle aSSeSSment 
centerS. 
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In their comprehensive strategy for serious, Violent, and chronic Juvenile 
offenders, wilson and Howell (1993) suggested that the juvenile justice 
system would be more efficient and effective if it emphasized community-
based approaches. their ideas were echoed by the members of the federal 
coordinating council on Juvenile Justice and delinquency Prevention (1996). 
RestoRAtIVe JUstIce
Another important shift in juvenile justice practice is the growing emphasis 
on restorative justice, an alternative framework for legal intervention, 
replacing or at least counter-balancing retributive justice. Retributive justice 
ensures that each offender suffers a punishment in proportion to the harm 
inflicted on the victim of the offense. Restorative justice provides a means for 
each offender to correct that harm, or at least to compensate the victim, even 
if the victim is the general community. 
several well-known program models are associated with the restorative 
justice movement, but the most popular are victim-offender mediation and 
family group conferencing. the number of these programs has increased 
sharply during the last 10 years, and research suggests that they may offer an 
effective alternative to traditional court processing (Bazemore and Umbreit 
1995; mcgarrell, olivares, crawford, and kroovand 2000). Restorative justice 
principles are also endorsed explicitly in Illinois state law. the “Juvenile Justice 
Reform Act of 1998” changed the purpose of juvenile justice in Illinois law to 
the pursuit of a proper balance between offender accountability and victim 
or community restoration. 
PosItIVe YoUtH deVeloPment
Finally, the design of the JIsc was shaped by an even more innovative 
approach—positive youth development (PYd). Positive youth development 
suggests that the goal of youth programs should be social attachment rather 
than behavioral control. Instead of focusing on problem avoidance and risk 
reduction, communities should help young people to establish a sense of 
identity, usefulness, and belonging. It is a simple notion. All adolescents 
need the experiences that youth in wealthy communities take for granted, 
including caring relationships with pro-social adults, the opportunity to play 
organized sports, self-expression through music and the arts, after-school 
employment, and civic engagement through group membership. 
the PYd framework emerged from several decades of efforts to create 
an alternative to the once-prevailing view of adolescence as a thicket of 
problems and deficits (national Research council 2002). Positive youth 
development is a comprehensive way of supporting the factors that facilitate 
a youth’s growth and successful transition to adulthood. Its concepts of are 
an attempt to answer critical questions, such as “what forces help youth to 
achieve productive and healthy adulthoods?” and “How can families and 
communities bring those forces to bear in the lives of individual youth?” the 
central purpose of PYd is action. while the term “adolescent development” 
describes the topic of scientific investigation in which researchers generate 
knowledge about the processes of individual growth and maturation, 
the term “positive youth development” represents the various methods, 
techniques, and practices used to apply scientific knowledge about 
adolescent development in agency and community settings (Pittman, Irby, 
and Ferber 2000). 
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despite broad public support for these concepts, positive youth development 
is not often used to design interventions for young offenders. the JIsc is 
an attempt to do so. Implementing a PYd approach for young offenders 
requires a broad range of interventions and strategies. directing services 
and supports toward the type of youth outcomes suggested by PYd means 
connecting youth with positive adult relationships, possibly through 
mentoring programs. It means expanding contacts between juvenile 
offenders and positive peer role models, perhaps with peer jury programs. 
It also means providing youth with educational supports; work experience; 
civic engagement; and safe, productive opportunities for physical activity and 
personal expression through music and the arts (Butts, Bazemore, and meroe 
2010). 
Almost by definition, the resources necessary to support a PYd approach 
have to be local and small scale. large bureaucracies cannot implement PYd 
strategies independently; they have to harness the power of volunteers, local 
businesses, neighborhood groups, and community organizations. developing 
and sustaining these resources is difficult and time consuming. If local 
governments try the shortcut of buying solutions from professional service 
providers, they usually end up with more bureaucracy and standardized 
services rather than with genuine community-based resources and 
opportunities for youth.
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sImIlAR PRogRAms In otHeR 
JURIsdIctIons |
the chicago JIsc is similar to other efforts to centralize delinquency preven-
tion and diversion services. Jurisdictions across the country have started a 
variety of similar programs in an attempt to provide earlier screening and 
assessment of youth, to identify young offenders with special needs, and to 
provide more timely interventions (cocozza and skowyra 2000; Rivers and 
Anwyl 2000). often called “juvenile assessment centers” (JAcs) or “community 
assessment centers” (cAcs), the programs are designed to provide systematic 
and consistent assessment of youth referred to the juvenile justice system 
and to accelerate the delivery of preventive services. their underlying goal is 
to provide an empirical basis for decision making regarding young offenders 
(Rivers and Anwyl 2000). 
Advocates for JAc and cAc programs see them as a means of identifying 
and eliminating gaps in services, facilitating integrated case management, 
improving communication among agencies, increasing the community’s 
awareness of youth needs, and providing more appropriate interventions and 
better outcomes for youth (oldenettel and wordes 2000). there have been 
very few evaluations of JAcs, but the literature generally suggests that the 
programs may reduce the time and resources necessary for law enforcement 
to process the youngest and least serious juvenile offenders. studies also indi-
cate that the presence of a JAc can lead to increased information sharing and 
collaboration among justice and social services agencies, increased numbers 
of youth referred for preventive services, and a broader use of diversion for 
youth. As always, however, the positive features of JAc programs have to be 
weighed against their potential negative characteristics, including the possi-
bility that the programs aggravate net widening, as law enforcement agen-
cies react to expanded interventions by expanding the type of youth they are 
willing to arrest (cronin 1996; cocozza, et al. 2005; castrianno 2007). 
the first known JAc opened in Florida in 1993, partially in response to a rash 
of highly publicized juvenile crimes that were damaging the tourist industry 
(cronin 1996). In 1995, relying heavily on the Florida JAc experience, the 
administrator of the federal office of Juvenile Justice and delinquency Pre-
vention (oJJdP) issued a brief report that examined the JAc concept (Bilchik 
1995). the report described the results of focus groups that were held to 
discuss the JAc concept and its implementation in Florida. It also considered 
whether the JAc model could reduce the systemic barriers encountered by 
juvenile justice agencies as they worked to implement the oJJdP’s compre-
hensive strategy for serious, Violent, and chronic Juvenile offenders (wilson 
and Howell 1993).  
the report recommended that future JAc programs incorporate several key 
program elements, including a single point of entry for youth referrals, im-
mediate and comprehensive assessments for youth, the use of management 
information systems capable of monitoring each youth’s progress through 
multiple treatment programs and across multiple systems, and a well-inte-
grated case management process. Five concerns about the JAc model were 
discussed as well, including the dangers of labeling young offenders, the 
potential for breaches of client confidentiality, the risk that expanding the 
JAc model could widen the net of justice system responsibility, the difficulties 
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of achieving true interagency coordination, and the possible risks to youth 
rights and due process (Bilchik 1995). However, the 1995 report recognized 
that the JAc concept was a promising strategy, and the Justice department 
announced that it would begin a demonstration project in 1996. Assessment 
centers began to spread across the United states soon thereafter. 
despite the growing popularity of community assessment centers, there 
has still been very little rigorous analysis of their effectiveness. most avail-
able information about JAc-style programs is descriptive, including program 
descriptions and practitioner recommendations. A search of the literature 
suggests that 20 programs have been investigated by independent research-
ers in recent years. nearly all the previous studies, however, were process 
evaluations. only one outcome evaluation has been published. the national 
council on crime and delinquency (nccd) studied four programs involved 
in an oJJdP demonstration initiative between 1997 and 1999 (wordes and 
le 2000). the study employed a quasi-experimental design and could not 
generate true evidence of program impact. nevertheless, the findings were 
generally supportive of the JAc model. 
the nccd study involved two operating assessment centers and two in the 
planning stages. the analysis included an examination of program records, 
staff interviews and surveys, reviews of assessment services, and a measure-
ment of recidivism using automated records. Researchers addressed the 
environmental context of the JAc programs and described their procedures 
for establishing client eligibility; their case-processing methods; the range of 
intervention programs they offered; their organizational linkages and rela-
tionships; and youth outcomes, including recidivism. 
Regarding the latter, the study compared the prevalence of recidivism among 
youth involved in the JAc programs with youth from a matched comparison 
group. experimental youth (JAc) and comparison youth (non-JAc) reoffended 
at about the same rate, although the JAc youth had more rearrests for prop-
erty and status offenses, while comparison youth had more rearrests for vio-
lent offenses. Involvement in a JAc program also appeared to be associated 
with a slower rate of subsequent recidivism. Among the youth who eventu-
ally reoffended, fewer JAc youth (46 percent) reoffended within the first three 
months than did non-JAc youth (77 percent). In one program, the researchers 
compared the recidivism of youth according to whether they were assessed 
fully. matched on race, sex, age, and offense type, the findings suggested that 
assessed youth were slightly less likely to recidivate than were nonassessed 
youth (41 percent versus 45 percent). the authors noted, however, that the 
findings should be interpreted with caution due to problems with data 
sources and case matching (wordes and le 2000).
 
the nccd study resulted in several key inferences about JAc programs and 
their effectiveness: 
 >  Intensive community involvement and collaboration is critical to the success of 
JAc programs, and achieving such collaboration sometimes requires the involve-
ment of outside facilitators.
 >  key program design elements such as ensuring a single point of entry for de-
linquent youth and colocating services are difficult to integrate and may not be 
feasible in all programs or in all instances. 
 
deSpIte the growIng 
popularIty of commu-
nIty aSSeSSment centerS, 
there haS StIll been very 
lIttle rIgorouS analySIS 
of theIr effectIveneSS. 
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>  the use of structured client assessments and systematic case processing is impor-
tant for implementing integrated case management approaches.
 
>  the use of an interagency management information system is a powerful incen-
tive for integrating services, but developing real-time, cross-system information is 
expensive and technically challenging, and it entails risks to client confidentiality. 
It was clear to the nccd researchers that access to integrated data is critical 
for meeting program operational goals as well as ensuring sound evaluation 
outcomes (oldenettel and wordes 2000; wordes and le 2000). the study also 
confirmed that launching a JAc program presents many challenges. Partner-
ing efforts are often complicated by turf issues; net widening is nearly always 
a significant concern; it is difficult to reconcile the competing functions of ser-
vices and public safety in one program location; and the availability of a JAc 




Researchers began this process evaluation by meeting with police officials, 
JIsc staff, and representatives from a dozen other chicago organizations 
to discuss the JIsc and its effectiveness. the research team then toured the 
facility and observed its operations, including the intake, screening, and case 
management process. In addition, researchers reviewed a range of docu-
ments from the JIsc and the client data systems used to monitor agency 
decisions and service delivery. Based on the information collected during the 
evaluation, the research team concluded that five areas were critical for the 
future development and effectiveness of the program: 1) funding; 2) program 
design and target population; 3) agency partnerships; 4) governance, man-
agement, and staffing; and 5) data and information sharing.
FUndIng
According to the research literature, funding is nearly always a challenge 
for programs like the JIsc. Few assessment centers have been supported 
exclusively through federal grants awarded directly to the program (cocozza 
et al. 2005). As in chicago, the programs are most frequently funded through 
a combination of federal, state, and local funds (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 
2005; clark 2007; silverthorn 2003). In at least one instance, an assessment 
center was able to fund its programs with resources from a community 
service Block grant (cronin 1996). In another instance, the staff of a center 
was funded through local parks and recreation budgets (Villarreal and witten 
2006). other creative funding arrangements have included private grants and 
in-kind donations of space and equipment from community-based agencies 
(cronin 1996). since the early days of the assessment center concept, 
foundation funding has been especially rare (cronin 1996). 
tHe cHIcAgo exPeRIence
the chicago JIsc experienced its share of difficulties due to funding issues. As 
early as 1999, city officials saw an opportunity to launch a new screening and 
referral program using money available through the Juvenile Accountability 
Block grant administered by the U.s. department of Justice. the funding was 
to be awarded to the state of Illinois and passed on to the city through the 
interagency Juvenile crime enforcement coalition and the chicago Police 
department (cPd). the intricacies of the funding mechanism added to the 
complications that would later emerge around the strategy and mission of 
the program.
when the JIsc was very close to opening, some officials were reportedly 
surprised to learn that much of the federal funding awarded to the city had 
already been spent to renovate the police building on south california street, 
and the program’s security arrangements were already finalized. According 
to city officials, initial conflicts over program funding were due at least partly 
to misunderstandings. Because of the complicated nature of interagency 
efforts and the fact that one of the key players, the department of children 
and Youth services (cYs), was a relatively new city agency, finalizing the 
operational plan for the JIsc took longer than expected. 
the partner agencies spent several years debating the structure and service 
approach to be used by the new program. the mayor’s office became 
concerned that the city could lose the federal funding if the approved (and 
even extended) budget period for the program expired before the JIsc itself 
opened.  
 the partner agencIeS 
Spent Several 
yearS debatIng the 
Structure and ServIce 
approach to be uSed 
by the new program.
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to expedite the development of the JIsc and to start the flow of federal 
expenditures, the cPd was authorized to use much of the initial grant to 
renovate the building in which the JIsc was to be housed. later, some critics 
believed that cPd had spent so much of the federal grant on the building 
that there was little money left for staffing and service delivery. these 
decisions, made for practical reasons, had unfortunate consequences for the 
stability of the JIsc and the strength of the interorganizational collaboration 
required to design and operate the program. 
there were also numerous issues related to funding as the JIsc began to 
receive referrals. the sinai community Institute, the organization contracted 
to provide case management services to JIsc youth, experienced long 
delays in receiving compensation due to cPd contracting requirements. 
misunderstandings continued to occur about who was in control of case 
management. when the city’s children and Youth services agency was 
officially included in JIsc operations, it wanted to alter the case management 
system in ways that cPd officials did not support or understand. this added 
more complexity to the existing funding issues. tensions over funding were 
highest during the year leading up the opening of the JIsc. By the second 
year of program operation, most budget issues had been resolved through 
the leadership and persistence of city officials, principally those at chicago 
Public schools, the department of children and Youth services, and the 
chicago Police department. 
PRogRAm desIgn And tARget PoPUlAtIon
In every previous evaluation of centralized assessment centers similar to the 
JIsc, researchers have discussed the importance of matching the program 
design to the target population. Although programs like the JIsc vary in how 
they define their target populations, they generally take two forms (cronin 
1996). slightly more than half the programs serve youth arrested for less 
serious offenses and those not considered appropriate for secure detention. 
some programs even provide services to noncriminal youth, including those 
referred for truancy. Just under half of all JAc programs serve a broader range 
of youth, including some arrested for serious offenses but often excepting 
cases involving violent offenses. the chicago JIsc handles a wide range of 
youth, including some headed for court referral and detention, but its case 
management component mainly targets youth charged with nonviolent 
offenses (i.e., those involving no gun charges), youth with few prior offenses, 
and youth whose current offense and prior record are not severe enough to 
justify secure detention or court referral. 
the design of JAc programs similar to the JIsc is often based on the needs 
of the target population, as identified by screening and assessment. the 
program elements most frequently discussed in the evaluation literature 
are youth screening and assessment; the case management process; the 
program’s source of referrals; the degree to which participation in services 
is mandatory; procedures for client follow-up; and the role of sanctions, 
consent, and parent involvement. In the majority of programs previously 
studied, initial screenings were conducted by police (cronin 1996; cocozza et 
al. 2005). In some programs, however, case management or counseling staff 
worked with their law enforcement partners to conduct screenings and to 
assess each youth’s appropriateness for referral to the program (cronin 1996; 
castrianno 2007). 
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In most programs, full assessments are conducted whenever a youth is 
identified during the initial screening as being in need of a full assessment. 
the comprehensiveness of these assessments and the tools used to conduct 
them vary. In all programs, however, case managers or counseling staff, rather 
than police officers, conduct the full client assessment. In some programs, 
families are included, but in others, only the youth is present (cronin 1996). 
some programs similar to the JIsc are either unable or are not designed to 
conduct full assessments. these programs generally serve a more limited 
population (Villarreal and witten 2006; 18th Judicial district Juvenile 
Assessment center 2007; wordes and le 2000). 
case managers provide referrals to outside services in almost all assessment 
centers similar to the JIsc, and nearly all such programs follow up with youth 
to ascertain their actual level of participation. If an assessment center does 
not involve outside service providers, it is usually because the program itself 
is operated by a service provider. A smaller number of assessment centers do 
not provide any referrals for services but instead conduct an initial screening 
that merely determines whether youth should go to court or be diverted 
(castrianno 2007). 
nearly half of all programs similar to the JIsc require youth to participate in 
services when referred. seven of 20 programs examined in previous studies 
included some mechanism to ensure that noncompliant youth received 
sanctions, including being referred back to the traditional juvenile justice 
process for prosecution (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 2005; Villarreal and 
witten 2006; castrianno 2007). However, only four of the programs rigorously 
tracked service participation by youth after they had been referred to outside 
providers. three of these four programs worked with youth who were 
mandated to participate in services (cocozza et al. 2005). 
tHe cHIcAgo exPeRIence 
the station-adjusted youth referred to sinai community Institute (scI) case 
management are the core clients of the JIsc, in that the JIsc represents an 
alternative approach for dealing with young offenders in chicago. when 
the first executive director of the JIsc started in 2006, approximately 5 to 8 
percent of youth arrested by the cPd and delivered to the JIsc were station 
adjusted and referred for scI services. that percentage soon rose to between 
15 and 20 percent. there is no predetermined number of youth that can 
be referred to case management, but the JIsc philosophy suggests that, 
whenever a youth can be feasibly and safely returned home and whenever 
the case does not involve a serious or violent charge, then the youth is 
appropriate for station adjustment and case management. 
the JIsc process involves some obvious contradictions. to put it very simply, 
there are two options for working with troubled youth accused of relatively 
minor offenses. one option is to connect the youth with case managers, 
social workers, and community agencies in an effort to turn them around 
and get them back on a path to healthy development and future citizenship. 
the second option relies on the justice system to ensure accountability and 
control youths’ behavior. 
the justice system demonstrates to youth that police, prosecutors, and 
judges have the power to inflict punishment and that illegal behavior results 
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like other aspects of the juvenile justice system, however, the JIsc seems 
to embrace both choices without true fidelity to either. the JIsc’s stated 
mission is to use social services to prevent future criminal behavior and to 
engage youth in community supports and opportunities that bind them 
to conventional social structures. when youth come into the JIsc, however, 
they are immediately handcuffed, fingerprinted, and photographed before 
spending up to several hours in what amounts to a holding cell. Youth receive 
mixed signals. of course, security issues are a real concern for staff at the JIsc. 
the case managers and social workers employed by scI do not often see the 
risks faced by cPd staff during the intake and screening process. For example, 
one cPd official relayed the story of a 13-year-old boy brought to the JIsc 
and found to be in possession of a pair of brass knuckles equipped with a 
hidden blade several inches long.  
As a precautionary measure, therefore, every youth is treated initially as if he 
or she might have a weapon. every youth is patted down and searched. many 
are handcuffed to the bench in the intake area. cPd officers point out that, 
without handcuffs, a distressed person could become panicked or enraged, 
endangering anyone in the room. when people are placed in custody, their 
mental state changes, and their reactions are unpredictable. According to one 
cPd officer, “It is impossible to know everybody’s personality. this is why they 
are secured to a bench during questioning. It is for their safety and for the 
safety of others.” 
what cPd officers do not acknowledge is the impact these security policies 
have on the rest of the JIsc process. A few hours after being handcuffed to a 
bench, a youth who ends up receiving a station adjustment and a referral to 
scI will be asked to sit in a room just yards away from the secure holding area 
and engage in an assessment with a case manager. the assessment requires 
the parent and youth to participate in an open and frank discussion about 
their issues with family, peers, and school. In a matter of hours and within the 
same small building, the JIsc process demands that youth go from a lock-up 
environment to a therapeutic milieu, and they are expected to cooperate fully 
with the staff in each setting. 
Parents may be irate by the time the assessment occurs. when the 
assessment begins, they may have been waiting in the JIsc lobby for three 
to four hours, at which point a case manager meets with them to obtain 
consent to implement a Youth Assessment and screen Instrument and other 
individualized assessments.  the goal of the assessment phase is to obtain as 
much information as possible about each youth and family. If the parent asks 
for the family assessment to be postponed until another time, the three most 
important consent forms are completed, and a home visit or an appointment 
at a neutral location is scheduled. the goals of the entire process are to 
complete the appointment within 24 hours, to triage cases effectively, and to 
implement the individual service plan as soon as possible. 
the scI service plan is a key component of the JIsc. the initial service 
plan meeting includes the parent or guardian in order to provide the case 
manager with a full understanding of each youth’s situation, especially if the 
juvenile is nonresponsive. If, during the initial assessment at the JIsc, the 
family indicates that more immediate intervention is necessary, scI will work 
to put supports in place right away.  
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the goal of case management is to employ a wide range of strategies and 
engage youth in a variety of services and supports that reduce the chances 
of future criminal behavior and subsequent justice involvement. one of the 
initial stated principles of the JIsc was to build its efforts with youth around 
the frameworks of restorative justice and positive youth development. the 
youth development approach and strength-based approaches that cultivate 
a youth’s existing strengths or talents, in particular, were very innovative ideas 
for chicago’s juvenile justice system. 
scI staff work to build on the strengths of each youth by asking a series 
of questions about the youth’s daily activities and then determining what 
services and supports might be appropriate. For example, a juvenile arrested 
for “tagging” walls might be referred to an art program. A youth interested in 
athletics may be connected with programs offered by the local park district. 
 
In deciding on referrals, case managers are especially concerned to find 
services and opportunities that are local and safe. the case manager makes 
the initial contact with a program, ensuring that there is space available, 
and then follows up to make certain the young person attends the initial 
appointment and begins services. the case manager gives the program as 
much information as possible about the youth. If transportation is an issue 
and there is no alternative, the case manager may even transport a youth 
to the various program sites involved in the service plan. If there is gang 
involvement or if the youth lives in a known gang area, the scI staff consider 
areas in which the juvenile can safely travel. 
when warranted, of course, scI refers families to counseling. If the situation 
calls for consistent and long-term treatment, families are referred to providers 
outside of scI. choosing the best resources for every client remains an 
individual decision. case managers try to develop their own relationships 
with outside providers; at the same time, they inform each other about the 
resources they use.  
case managers try to find services that are accessible to the family. If there is 
a relatively inexpensive option—for example, a YmcA membership—scI will 
often offer resources to cover the fee. case managers look for services that 
families will be able to maintain. still, two years after the opening of the JIsc, 
few people involved with the program were entirely satisfied with the type 
of community-based resources available. case managers at scI reported that 
sometimes very few options were available for clients beyond the traditional 
menu of school-based programs, family counseling, and anger management 
programs.  
the development of new resources for youth remained difficult in part 
because the JIsc was  controversial among some youth professionals in 
chicago. many people working in the youth advocacy community were 
opposed to the idea of the JIsc because published accounts of efforts to 
implement similar centers in Florida were often quite negative, indicating 
that the model had failed to meet expectations, partly due to the reduced 
discretion of patrol officers responsible for making initial decisions regarding 
individual youth.  some youth advocates involved in the evolution of the 
JIsc were concerned that the program would contribute to net widening. 
these community members feared that the mere presence of the JIsc as an 
alternative to traditional police processing might increase the willingness of 
the goal of caSe 
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police, schools, and social services to involve young offenders in the justice 
process. Ironically, these advocates could view the range of interventions 
offered to JIsc youth as a risk because a rich and diverse array of resources 
could encourage police to make more arrests and to bring more youth 
through the JIsc process. these concerns may have been allayed somewhat 
by the fact that the number of youth referred to the JIsc actually declined 
during its first two years of operation. 
even after the JIsc had been open for more than a year, some staff at JIsc 
partner agencies believed the program was not identifying young offenders 
early enough or providing sufficient interventions. According to one worker, 
by the time youth were referred to the JIsc, many of them had needed 
intervention for some time. some youth were arrested at school for troubling 
incidents that took place weeks or months earlier. In other cases that 
resulted in JIsc referrals, students may have simply been at the wrong place 
at the wrong time and could have become involved in an incident almost 
accidentally. If case managers had been immediately on hand, some of these 
youth might have been handled differently and might not have required 
further justice processing. 
the foundational concept behind the JIsc was to take youth who would have 
traditionally been station adjusted at individual station houses within various 
police districts and bring them to one place where there could be a more 
thoughtful evaluation that might distinguish between youth who needed 
more formalized juvenile justice involvement and those who did not. the 
JIsc process is a drastic improvement over the old station-house process of 
writing down the names of juveniles, talking with them about making better 
choices, and then sending them home and hoping for the best. with the JIsc, 
youth and their families have access to case management services designed 
to follow their progress more closely and to help youth stay out of trouble. 
Unfortunately, the original description of the JIsc left the issue of what 
type of services should be included fairly ambiguous. the cPd worked 
with a consultant to construct a specific JIsc screening instrument that was 
supposed to indicate what services would be appropriate, but there was little 
clarity regarding the application of the screening and what would be done 
when needed services were not available. 
It was never easy to describe the JIsc model because much of the actual 
intervention depends on the decisions made by case managers and their 
success in actually involving youth in various services, supports, and 
opportunities. what exactly happens with JIsc youth once they begin case 
management? According to one worker at scI, sometimes case management 
involves referring youth for particular services, “but a lot of times we just 
work with them, make sure they are going to school … and we work with the 
family, we document that we went to the school and worked with the school 
to get the youth back in, or we go with mom to sign papers at the school.” 
such a characterization of case management may be accurate, but it is also 
one of the reasons that cPd staff continued to be skeptical of scI well after 
the center opened.
According to some cPd officials, case management appeared to be a 
euphemism for inconsistent and ad hoc interventions provided in an 
uncoordinated fashion and with little documentation of the program’s 
activities or effects. 
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despite these criticisms, most of the chicago practitioners and policy 
makers interviewed for this study remained very supportive of the JIsc in 
theory. several people involved in the program, including some cPd officers, 
envisioned the JIsc as a community-oriented and family-friendly place where 
parents could simply walk in with their children if they were having trouble 
supervising them or managing their behavior. In fact, by 2008 the JIsc was 
seeing about 200 families per year on a walk-in basis. 
In an even more desirable situation, cPd officers could encourage clients 
to seek help from the JIsc voluntarily. the ideal scenario might involve an 
officer who has some experience with a family and believes that a youth is 
at risk of justice involvement. Rather than making an arrest, the officer could 
encourage the youth and family to go to the JIsc. Perhaps the officer could 
even agree to meet them there and then facilitate the youth’s entrance into 
the JIsc process, but without making an arrest and without fingerprinting 
and booking. the youth could still be connected with the resources made 
available through the scI case management process. 
According to another cPd official, however, using the JIsc as a walk-in center 
for neighborhood families could have unintended consequences. Parents 
who were unable to access other resources for their troubled youth could 
end up reporting them to the police simply in an effort to get them under 
control and back on track. It would be up to the JIsc staff to warn parents that 
involving their children in the justice system even informally entails risk.  
eventually, the JIsc might be a place for parents and kids to get real help 
with services. more than two years after it opened, however, few people 
interviewed for this study were convinced that the JIsc was able to offer 
the full range of resources and supports once envisioned. most observers 
believed much work remained. 
Finally, several people interviewed for this study worried about the strength 
of the JIsc approach if the cPd and the state’s Attorney’s office were unable 
to act in concert in cases of noncompliant youth. As mentioned earlier, 
when a youth failed to follow through with the JIsc service plan, the cook 
county state’s Attorney’s office decided whether to prosecute the youth 
on his or her original charges. JIsc youth were most likely referred to scI 
case management in the first place, however, because their offenses were 
not serious enough to warrant prosecution. thus, the state’s Attorney could 
be unlikely to file charges, even if the youth had failed to comply with case 
management. were this fact to become widely known in the community, of 
course, it could undermine the strength and integrity of the JIsc. Facing the 
same circumstances, other youth programs, such as teen courts, sometimes 
arrange for mandatory prosecution agreements in cases of noncooperating 
youth so that parents and youth know that failure to participate will result in 
court proceedings (Butts, Buck, and coggeshall 2002).  
 
AgencY PARtneRsHIPs
Agency partnerships have been a central concern in nearly all previous 
studies of assessment centers similar to the JIsc (cronin 1996; cocozza et 
al. 2005; Harrison and gisseman 2006 2007; Villarreal and witten 2006; clark 
2007; silverthorn 2003). Partnerships during the planning process frequently 
involve key juvenile justice figures such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
juvenile court judges, and court staff as well as law enforcement agencies. 
At least half the programs previously described by researchers involved 
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partnerships that included state and city government leaders, public health 
officials, child and family social service agencies, mental health providers, 
drug treatment agencies, and public schools. Approximately one-fourth of 
the programs involved child protection agencies (cronin 1996; cocozza et 
al. 2005; Harrison and gisseman 2006, 2007), while legal aid organizations 
and local community organizations such as the United way, the chamber of 
commerce, and community foundations were sometimes involved but less 
frequently than the more mainstream youth-related agencies (castrianno 
2007).
the agency partnerships developed by juvenile assessment center programs 
are almost always contentious. Partners disagree about policies and methods 
of practice, guidelines for distributing clients and jobs, the extent (or lack) 
of collaboration with surrounding communities, and the nature of their 
respective roles and responsibilities (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 2005; 
wordes and le 2000). some centers similar to the JIsc have involved outside 
mediators in their efforts to find acceptable solutions to complex problems 
related to partnerships and collaboration. other programs have found that 
strong leadership, clear role expectations, and simply having more time for 




Forming effective partnerships was always a critical challenge for the 
chicago JIsc. the center was designed as a multiagency partnership, but 
there were many interorganizational issues that had to be resolved before 
the process could operate smoothly. major partners included the chicago 
Police department, the chicago department of children and Youth services, 
the chicago Public schools, the cook county state’s Attorney’s office, and 
the cook county department of Juvenile Probation. However, the degree 
of involvement of the different partners varied. some agencies were more 
central in the design and development of the center than others. For 
example, cPd staff prepared the federal grant proposal that made the JIsc 
possible. this allowed the cPd to take a leading (some would say controlling) 
role in the development of the center.  
the original proposal that funded the JIsc named the chicago department 
of Human services as the lead service provider. soon after, however, most 
city programs for children and youth were combined to form a new agency, 
the department of children and Youth services (cYs). the new agency 
accepted responsibility for the social services component at the JIsc, and 
the first executive director of the JIsc was a cYs employee. By the time 
the JIsc opened its doors in 2006, the cPd and cYs were viewed as the 
principal partners. some critical problems, however, had still not been solved. 
In particular, the uncomfortable presence of cPd’s security procedures 
throughout the JIsc process had not been addressed effectively, despite 
repeated attempts by city officials to resolve the issue. 
the JIsc building inspired other concerns that affected the partnership. A 
number of officials interviewed for this study noted the challenges involved 
in placing the JIsc in a police department building on chicago’s south 
california street. one city staff member observed that, “Although we really 
try not to call it a police station, the families recognize the building as a police 
station, and as much as we try to explain that it’s not, it’s hard to break down 
that image, or that label, in their minds … they talk about it that way.”  
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In order to succeed, the JIsc needed to be a collaboration among 
organizations. many professionals involved in the program expressed a 
fear that the central role played by the cPd could limit the effectiveness of 
the JIsc. leaders of community organizations involved with the program 
expressed respect for individual police officers, but they also acknowledged 
that they did not have a positive relationship with the department as a 
whole. It was partly due to these concerns that the designers of the JIsc 
wanted social services to play a strong role in the program. In particular, case 
management at the center was to be a social services function and not a 
police department operation. 
some observers believed that the chicago Police department saw the JIsc 
primarily as an opportunity to improve the efficiency of case processing. 
Before the opening of the center, cPd officers took juvenile offenders to 
any one of many different locations throughout the city for booking and 
processing. this resulted in lengthy delays, as the arresting officer(s) had to 
wait for designated juvenile officers to review and process each case before 
they could return to patrol duties. Under the centralized system enabled 
by the JIsc, officers were able to bring youth to a single location, use a 
computerized processing station to prepare their paperwork and file the 
initial arrest report, and then turn the youth over to the JIsc process and get 
back onto the street more quickly. the presence of the JIsc allowed for much 
quicker turnaround and much less downtime for officers. In fact, cPd officers 
making juvenile arrests were under a mandate to spend as little time as 
possible at the JIsc. one police official described cPd efforts to get arresting 
officers back on the street quickly as a “top priority” of the department. In 
2008, cPd officers estimated that it took 45 minutes for an arresting officer to 
process a youth at the JIsc and return to patrol duty. this was far quicker than 
at traditional station houses, where an officer might be off the street for more 
than two hours (see sidebar). 
According to police officials, however, the department was always in support 
of bringing greater consistency to screening and assessment decisions 
made at the JIsc. In fact, the cPd developed new juvenile screening 
procedures specifically for the JIsc. A centralized and closely coordinated 
screening and referral process made sense to nearly everyone, at least in 
the abstract. However, centralization also reduces discretion, and it may 
add inconvenience for some decision makers. After the implementation of 
the JIsc process, some cPd officers missed the degree of latitude they once 
enjoyed in deciding how to respond to individual youth. According to one 
officer, as soon as the JIsc opened, it was clear that cPd leadership and the 
state’s Attorney’s office were going to be far more involved than before in 
determining individual case outcomes. Before the JIsc, officers themselves 
often decided whether a youth was to be referred to juvenile court, adjusted, 
deferred, or diverted. the expansion of people and organizations involved in 
case-related decision making was not always welcome. 
In the view of other city leaders, the increased transparency and consistency 
of case processing and case management for young offenders was exactly 
the point of starting the JIsc. when the JIsc first opened, and before the 
department of children and Youth services had assumed its prominent role, 
cPd staff had continued the screening and referral practices it had always 
used for juvenile arrests. For many (even most) youth arrested for relatively 
minor offenses, this meant a referral to one of the local service providers that 
had long-term associations with the cPd. the choices available for minor 
the JIsc saves enough Police 
work time for nearly 5 Full-
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officer is “off the 
street” to process a 
juvenile arrest at the 
JIsc
1 hour, 45 
minutes
officer work time 
saved for each 
juvenile arrest 
processed at the JIsc 
(i.e., 2 ½ hours minus 
45 minutes)
5,600 arrests Annual number 
of juvenile arrests 
processed at the 
chicago JIsc (as of 
2008)
9,800 hours estimated annual 
number of cPd 
officer work hours 
saved by processing 
juvenile arrests at the 
chicago JIsc (i.e., 1 
hour and 45 minutes 
multiplied by 5,600)
2,016 hours Annual work hours 
of a cPd officer (i.e., 
168 hours per month 
multiplied by 12)
4.9 officers estimated number 
of full-time officer 
positions potentially 
created by the 
availability of the JIsc 
per year (i.e., 9,800 
hours divided by 
2,016 hours)
note: Figures for “off-street” time were derived 
by asking working cPd officers to estimate 
the time required to process juvenile arrests in 
various police districts. 
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offenders were extremely limited, and cPd officers were not encouraged to 
look for resources outside the established comfort zone.
soon after the JIsc opened, the chicago department of children and Youth 
services stopped the cPd case management process. Instead, the sinai 
community Institute (scI) was contracted to handle all case management 
services for JIsc-involved youth. naturally, this meant that fewer youth would 
be referred to other providers, including some with long-term relationships 
with the cPd. this change created conflict between the key JIsc partners. 
Previously, the cPd had used a printed directory of local service providers to 
identify available programs for arrested youth. when sinai became involved, 
the cPd forwarded this directory to them and suggested that scI workers 
might want to interview the existing agencies and continue to make use of 
their services.
 
From the perspective of the chicago department of children and Youth 
services, however, the essential mission of the JIsc was to expand the pool of 
resources beyond those already used by the cPd. In a true case management 
system, the case manager (in this context, scI) serves as a broker and recruiter 
of service providers and is not simply a referral mechanism. JIsc officials 
described scI’s responsibility as connecting every youth with whatever 
services and supports were appropriate, whether or not such services were 
already provided by an existing agency or even by scI itself. In particular, the 
JIsc philosophy required more resources designed to engage and support 
the strengths of youth rather than merely to identify and treat their deficits. 
In the view of some cPd officials, the JIsc philosophy sounded appealing, but 
pursuing a drastic expansion of resources could result in less accountability. 
they worried that scI and its network of providers would not communicate 
with the cPd about case outcomes. when asked about this criticism, the 
managers of some nonprofit agencies in chicago agreed with the cPd 
assessment, but they viewed limited data sharing with the cPd as a virtue 
rather than a defect. the mission of prevention services, they argued, is to 
serve youth and families and to advocate their interests. one of the principal 
goals of prevention programs is to keep youth from becoming more deeply 
involved in the justice system. If an agency informed police officers about 
each and every development in a youth’s case, they could jeopardize that 
youth’s future success. In the view of service providers, it is necessary to 
place an informational barrier between the social services sector and the law 
enforcement sector. 
the chicago Police department actually agreed with this view. Placing a 
“firewall” between the cPd and case management was, in fact, a critically 
important feature of the JIsc process. Police officials did not want highly 
detailed information about the youth referred for case management, but they 
also didn’t want to operate completely in the dark. cPd officials asked that 
the department receive some form of case outcome summary for each youth. 
However, community members were fearful of how the cPd would use any 
case-specific information it obtained.  
the issues surrounding case management and information sharing are a 
key to understanding the tensions that existed between the organizational 
partners involved in the JIsc. From the very beginning of the JIsc, some 
service providers were seen as closely allied with the cPd, while others were 
seen as partners of the sinai community Institute and the department of 
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children and Youth services. some cPd staff believed that their providers had 
been moved aside and were beginning to suffer from reduced referrals, while 
scI was protecting its own network of service providers. Until a case-tracking 
information system could begin to generate reliable data about the patterns 
of youth referrals and case outcomes, these suspicions would continue to 
fester, making interagency cooperation more difficult. 
In the view of some local agencies, on the other hand, the effort to design 
and launch the JIsc may have been chaotic and sometimes contentious, but 
even these conflicts had immediate benefits. According to one experienced 
youth worker, the quality and extent of communication among the cPd, the 
chicago department of children and Youth services, the sinai community 
Institute, the chicago Public schools, and community-based programs 
during the development process was very helpful. Inter-organizational 
communication is essential in making collaborative centers like the JIsc 
successful. the traditionally negative atmosphere and lack of effective 
communication among youth-serving systems in the city had often 
prevented endeavors like the JIsc in the past. Partner agencies would clash 
about mission and strategy, some would then leave, and everyone would end 
up with even less motivation for the next time collaboration was required. 
open communication was seen as a critical feature of the JIsc development 
process. According to this argument, the more open and transparent quality 
of the debate was actually quite productive. 
For example, the implementation of the JIsc gave city officials a reason to 
review other areas of policy and practice related to youth. coordination 
between the cPd and the city school system had not always been effective. 
during one JIsc development meeting, a cPd official described how his 
agency received numerous calls from the chicago Public schools, often for 
incidents that the cPd believed should be handled at the school, either 
though school-based discipline or alternatives such as the peer jury program. 
the cYs learned that the school disciplinary code did not provide principals 
and teachers with enough discretion. school personnel could react either 
by calling the police or by not reporting the incident—there was no middle 
ground. As part of the JIsc development process, cYs reached out to local 
high schools and was able to begin a useful dialogue on the matter. 
local decision makers tried to incorporate the views of key groups as the JIsc 
designed its case management approach. Researchers, justice professionals, 
and community members met to discuss strategies, with the objective of 
building better interagency relationships and exploring best practices. those 
involved believed that effective case management was essential to the 
success of the JIsc. one person interviewed for this study even characterized 
the case management function as the best way to avoid net widening. 
many people involved in the design of the JIsc expressed the concern that 
it could transform the purpose of station adjustments. If police began to 
increase the numbers of youth they apprehended simply in order to refer 
them for preventive services, this would widen the net of intervention. seeing 
that the newly centralized process was more efficient, cPd officers might 
begin to bring youth into the system on lesser offenses for which, before, 
they might simply have issued a warning, in part to avoid the delays and 
paperwork associated with an arrest.  community representatives called 
for increased accountability and transparency in police processing, arguing 
that even station adjustments could become cumulative burdens for youth. 
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If youth accrue numerous station adjustments, it would not matter if they 
were just 13 years old and charged with minor offenses; they would be more 
likely to go to court and more likely to be prosecuted. thus, youth living in a 
neighborhood served by the JIsc may be more at risk of court involvement, 
simply because a record of station adjustments at the JIsc may propel them 
into the justice system more quickly. For this reason, some youth services 
professionals argue that arresting youth and taking them to the JIsc may not 
always be the best way to support youth and families, even though the JIsc 
was designed to do just that.  
goVeRnAnce, mAnAgement, And stAFFIng
of the 20 previous program evaluations reviewed for this study, 14 included 
a discussion of governance issues, 15 investigated the effects of program 
staffing, and nearly half addressed the dynamics of the co-location of 
services. A board of representatives from community-based and government 
agencies governed the majority of the programs reviewed. Programs were 
managed by community-based agencies specializing in mental health or 
managed care (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 2005; clark 2007; wordes and le 
2000). Approximately 20 percent were managed by city or county lead social 
service agencies, and one was managed by the juvenile justice system (cronin 
1996; Harrison and gisseman 2006; 18th Judicial district Juvenile Assessment 
center 2007; castrianno 2007; wordes and le 2000; silverthorn 2003). 
the size of assessment centers similar to the JIsc varied by community 
and was often dependent on program design, target population, and the 
size of the community itself. the programs were most frequently staffed 
by a combination of community-based social service agencies and law 
enforcement. social service agencies provided intake, assessment, and case 
management services. law enforcement provided escorts, security, and 
initial screenings (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 2005; Villarreal and witten 2006; 
castrianno 2007; clark 2007; silverthorn 2003).
other staff might include school system staff, substance abuse workers, city 
and/or county social services, juvenile justice personnel, and interns and/
or volunteers. Approximately 40 percent of programs were staffed by school 
officials, including truancy specialists, academic information specialists, and/
or clinical service workers. substance abuse workers were less common, 
although they were present in approximately 30 percent of the juvenile 
assessment centers studied previously (cronin 1996; cocozza et al. 2005; 
Harrison and gisseman 2006, 2007; 18th Judicial district Juvenile Assessment 
center 2007). city and/or county social services; juvenile justice personnel, 
including the district attorney; and student interns were involved in some of 
the assessment centers examined by researchers (cronin 1996; 18th Judicial 
district Juvenile Assessment center 2007; wordes and le 2000). 
staffing issues are often complicated by the diverse institutional and work 
cultures of the various agencies that cooperate to design and operate the 
programs (wordes and le 2000). tensions between law enforcement and 
service providers were mentioned in some studies. colocation of services was 
noted in almost half of the programs studied previously. several assessment 
centers were colocated with diversion programs (wordes and le 2000; 
silverthorn 2003). In a few programs, assessment centers were attached to 
substance abuse facilities (wordes and le 2000) or colocated with truancy 
centers. (cronin 1996). 
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In some cases, researchers observed that the general public did not 
understand the distinction between the staff of the juvenile assessment 
center and the staff of the agency providing colocated services. However, 
the blurring of these lines was not seen as problematic and was often seen 
as evidence that collaboration and colocation were functioning well (cronin 
1996; wordes and le 2000).  
tHe cHIcAgo exPeRIence
the JIsc structure was complicated from the very beginning. the federal 
grant that launched the center specifically authorized the city’s Juvenile 
crime enforcement coalition to exercise oversight, and its members quickly 
assumed a supervisory role over JIsc operations. Yet, there was a separate 
oversight board as well as a board of directors for the JIsc. the executive 
director appeared to be answerable to all three bodies, creating redundancy 
and confusion. there were also several organizational charts during the early 
phases of JIsc operations. one chart portrayed the JIsc using cPd’s mission, 
goals, and objectives; another used the cYs mission and goals; a third relied 
on the goals and objectives of the Juvenile crime enforcement coalition. the 
charts were not integrated, but all were circulating at the same time, causing 
considerable confusion. 
the JIsc executive director was placed in the unenviable position of trying to 
stitch together two completely different units of city government (cPd and 
cYs) that had two completely different missions and cultures. compounding 
these difficulties was the fact that the JIsc had become operational before 
the two units had an opportunity to come together to form a shared vision 
for it. the cPd opened the police and intake components before cYs had the 
service provision component in place. In addition, both departments were 
authorized to commit JIsc funds and resources, but they were not organized 
to do this in a collaborative manner. the lack of coordination led to difficult 
interactions between cPd and cYs, and between the JIsc director and other 
JIsc staff.
the location of the chicago JIsc also presented many challenges. during 
the earliest discussions, the plan was to locate the facility in a north side 
neighborhood, but many of those involved strongly opposed that location. 
local residents, in particular, did not want a program for juvenile offenders 
in their community. Rather than fight the community, city officials chose a 
south side neighborhood. that site, however, introduced other complexities, 
as mentioned earlier. the central problem was that the building chosen was 
an existing police station in need of renovation. By the time the JIsc actually 
opened, the cPd was seen as the owner of the program, and it was unclear 
how the social services and case management function would be integrated. 
one key person interviewed for this study believed that the cPd always 
intended to continue using its own network of service providers and that its 
search for new providers was not entirely genuine. 
After the JIsc opened, the presence of nonpolice personnel inside a police 
building was a continual source of misunderstanding. tensions sometimes 
boiled over in incidents that appear trivial in retrospect. For example, 
during the first year of operation, several framed portraits of cPd leaders 
were suddenly removed from the front hallway. many officers assumed that 
the JIsc executive director (an employee of cYs rather than of cPd) had 
requested their removal. After a period of morale-damaging rumors, it was 
discovered that the order to remove the portraits had come from the cPd 
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itself, which was awaiting the arrival of new replacements, but the officers 
working at the JIsc had not been informed. 
Another issue concerned the labeling of the parking space reserved for 
the JIsc executive director. some cPd officers placed great value on the 
proximity and visibility of their parking spaces. Parking was ordinarily 
reserved for top officials, and their titles were sometimes displayed on their 
respective spots. the executive director of the JIsc was to receive a parking 
place near the front door, but labeling the sign with the words “executive 
director” became problematic, as it suggested that a non-cPd person was 
in charge of a cPd facility. Resolving the dispute consumed an inordinate 
amount of time and energy. 
other conflicts focused on the efforts made for the center’s clients. some 
cPd officials worried that the range of services available through cYs and its 
contractor, scI, was not sufficient for the youth involved with the JIsc, but the 
police often felt excluded from conversations and planning related to youth 
interventions. If the available services were not comprehensive and flexible 
enough to meet the individual needs of youth, then the JIsc model could 
ultimately fail, and the cPd worried that it would be blamed for the failure.  
other challenges related to the flow of information between cPd staff and 
other staff at the JIsc. Although cPd officers and the JIsc executive director 
worked in the same location and on the same general tasks, the executive 
director, as a civilian, had limited ability to disseminate information directly 
to cPd officers. even distributing a newsletter or memorandum about 
JIsc operations was considered a violation of cPd protocol—disregarding 
the chain of command—if it was done by a civilian. only the onsite cPd 
lieutenant was authorized to provide such material to cPd officers. 
some problems stemmed from confusion over the sponsorship of the 
center. when the JIsc first opened, it was easy to see why members of the 
community might have viewed it as just another police program. First, it was 
located in a former station house with the words “Police station” carved in 
stone over the entrance. next, upon entering the building, visitors walked 
down a hallway decorated with those framed portraits of uniformed police 
commanders. the JIsc staff who first greeted visitors were also uniformed 
cPd personnel. the civilian personnel were located upstairs or in offices not 
otherwise accessible to visitors. the entire operation was focused on physical 
security and control and was staffed by uniformed police. why would visitors 
think the JIsc was anything other than a police station? 
the city administration approved the presence of civilians at the JIsc, but 
cPd argued that for security reasons, uniformed officers should be visible at 
all times at the front desk. one cPd leader pointed out that the sign in front 
of the building still described it as a police station and police services needed 
to be accessible. All parties agreed that having multiple agencies in the same 
building was desirable, but cPd stressed that it was important for the police 
presence to be paramount. 
most of these issues were raised during early discussion about the design 
of the JIsc, but when the building opened, the problems had not been 
addressed effectively. one participant who was involved very early in the 
development of the JIsc noted that, even in 2008, there was still “ambiguity 
about who is in charge. Is it the executive director, or is it cPd? there is still 
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tension there. who makes decisions about the program?” According to 
this observer, any effort to resolve such tensions would have to involve the 
mayor’s office. “sometimes an external party has to step in and nudge [the 
players] back into place.” the strong leadership of the JIsc executive director 
and the visible commitment to the JIsc by key stakeholders at cPd and cYs 
eventually led to improved relations between the two organizations. once 
there was more of a shared understanding of the JIsc, some of the more 
contentious issues could be addressed.  
some of challenges faced by the JIsc have been related to the various 
levels of government involved in juvenile justice policy in chicago. one city 
official admitted that the JIsc was affected by a long-standing “city/county 
problem.” In other words, 
 why isn’t the city talking with the county as they work to figure  
 out the detention center issue? How can we support them in  
 building a network [of services]? why aren’t we talking with cook  
 county and the Illinois department of Juvenile Justice to figure out  
 how to pilot something in the city of chicago for kids who come  
 back from a dJJ [department of Juvenile Justice] facility? why can’t  
 we talk with the county about how to support the needs of kids in  
 detention or the kids who have been released when their cases are  
 still open and they need supportive services?
the involvement of private agencies further complicated matters. the sinai 
community Institute is a 501(c)(3) and part of the sinai Health systems. 
when scI was first approached to work with the JIsc, it had been providing 
management services in the chicago area for more than 20 years. In 2006, 
the scI staff was asked to serve only as technical advisors for the JIsc. the 
city planned to hire case managers, and scI was asked to conduct case 
management training. the training took place over three months, after which 
scI received a request to hire the staff for actual case management work at 
the JIsc. eventually, scI became deeply involved in the design and operation 
of the JIsc case management process. Yet many important decisions about 
program design and staffing had already been made. It was difficult for the 
scI staff to know which features of the JIsc were already established and 
which features were open to modification.  
the line staff at scI originally consisted of social workers, case managers, 
and youth advocates. the social workers were primarily supervisors, but 
they provided services as well, often by conducting individual counseling 
and anger management groups. the case managers conducted youth and 
family assessments and oversaw the development of service plans. the 
youth advocates worked directly with youth and families to make sure the 
service plans were implemented properly. case managers performed the 
initial assessments (the Youth Assessment and screening Instrument and scI 
assessments) at the JIsc, often on the youth’s first day of contact with the 
center. once all assessments were completed, an scI youth advocate would 
begin to work with each youth and family. the advocates conducted home 
visits and implemented the Individual Family service Plan. Youth advocates 
often worked with 30 or more cases each, but the initial goal was for each 
advocate to have responsibility for no more than 20 to 25 cases.  
during the early phase of JIsc operations, there were often conflicts between 
the case managers and the youth advocates. some of the conflicts were 
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inevitable. Youth advocates earned lower salaries, yet they performed many 
of the same tasks as the case managers. tensions grew as the JIsc caseload 
began to increase. the youth advocates believed that case managers spent 
a lot of their time in the office, just “waiting for referrals,” while the advocates 
were feeling overwhelmed with ever-growing caseloads and duties that took 
them into some of chicago’s most disadvantaged homes and neighborhoods. 
the conflicts were soon resolved by eliminating the distinction between case 
managers and youth advocates. Instead, all direct line scI staff at the JIsc 
were designated as case managers.  
several city officials involved in setting up the JIsc acknowledged in 
interviews that many of the initial challenges were organizational and 
structural. despite serious conflicts during the early phases of designing 
the center, however, one leader in city government observed that, at some 
point, most of the people involved realized that it was time to “let go of 
the past” and instead to focus on creating a useful organizational structure 
for a program that would eventually come to exist. By the second year of 
operation, the JIsc had much more defined roles for all the agencies involved 
in its operations and a much clearer understanding of the proper roles of the 
board, the advisory board, the JIsc executive director, the leadership of cYs, 
and various officers and leaders of the cPd.
dAtA And InFoRmAtIon sHARIng
the emergence of juvenile assessment centers occurred during a time of 
rapid technological innovation. during the 1990s and 2000s, social agencies 
of all types were becoming accustomed to the use of integrated information 
systems. law enforcement systems, juvenile justice systems, and, indeed, all 
human services enterprises operate more efficiently and effectively when 
client data are integrated across agencies and when client outcomes can 
be monitored at the individual, programmatic, and jurisdictional levels. Yet 
access to such data inevitably raises concerns about data management and 
the uses to which such data could be put beyond program operation. In some 
communities where officials have tried to implement assessment centers 
similar to the JIsc, worries about information sharing and data privacy were 
severe enough that key agencies ended up withdrawing from the programs 
(cronin 1996). the data issues raised in previous studies may be different from 
the ones faced by programs today, but many of the core considerations, such 
as the construction of integrated databases and procedures for information 
sharing, remain relevant. 
Youth-serving agencies are always concerned about the legal issues related 
to information sharing and client privacy, including the issue of net widening, 
but access to reliable and actionable information is critical for system impact. 
many programs ask clients to sign consent forms acknowledging their 
participation in the assessment process and their awareness of the program’s 
tracking of information, in order to ensure that clients understand their 
rights to privacy but that data about their service participation may be used 
in future court proceedings (cronin 1996) most juvenile assessment center 
programs require parents to sign such consent forms, and some require youth 
to sign as well (clark 2007; cronin 1996). even when signatures are required, 
however, previous studies have noted that program staff are sometimes 
concerned that youth and parents do not fully understand the implications 
of consent. Assessment centers like the JIsc have sometimes formed 
interdisciplinary teams to monitor problems arising from the collection and 
use of client information. 
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tHe cHIcAgo exPeRIence
According to city officials, the chicago JIsc handled approximately 3,000 
youth in its first six months of operation. Initially, there were no systematic 
efforts to track the participation of these youth in the case management 
and services provided by the JIsc. within a year, however, the creation and 
distribution of data about JIsc clients had become a major concern for all 
the organizational partners. As was true with other elements of the JIsc 
process, the partners from law enforcement and social services often found 
themselves on opposite sides of the debate. 
From a law enforcement perspective, it was essential to track the involvement 
of each youth in JIsc-related services and to apprise the state’s Attorney’s 
office of any case in which a youth refused to comply with JIsc requirements. 
not only did the police department wish to hold youth accountable for their 
agreements to participate in the program, but cPd officials believed it was 
important to track participation and outcomes in order to respond effectively 
in cases in which a youth is rearrested following a referral to the JIsc. officers 
reviewing the new charge would need to know that the youth had been 
diverted previously, and their decision to divert a second charge could 
depend on the youth’s level of cooperation after the first charge. In addition, 
the cPd wanted to know exactly what mix of services, opportunities, and 
supports had been offered to a youth, not only to plan future interventions 
for that particular youth but to assess the overall effectiveness of the services 
and programs available.  
From a social services perspective, however, diversion means diversion. If 
the JIsc process was constructed to give youth another chance and to spare 
them the stigma of involvement with the justice system, then as soon as the 
youth and parent sign the consent form and begin to work with scI case 
management, they are social services clients and not juvenile offenders 
whose movements must be monitored by the police. If the youth and families 
involved in case management knew that their behavior was being reported 
back to the police and that their cooperativeness would affect future 
decisions made by cPd and the state’s Attorney’s office, they would be far 
less likely to trust the scI staff. It would also be harder for them to see the 
services and supports offered by the case managers in a positive light. 
these basic differences in perspective complicated efforts to create useful 
information about JIsc operations and client outcomes. After two years of 
operation, people working with the JIsc on a daily basis were still not entirely 
clear about just what type of data could be shared with others outside their 
own agencies. All the partner agencies agreed that some client processing 
information should be readily accessible so that problems and issues could 
be identified quickly and addressed effectively. Yet, according to one staff 
member of a JIsc-related agency in early 2008, sometimes it was still not clear 
“what information can go where, and who can have access to what.”
In interviews conducted for this study, several city officials emphasized that 
the police did not need to see comprehensive individualized information 
about the progress of each JIsc-involved youth, but they did need to know 
whether a minor complied with services or not, and they did need to know 
whether the youth and family were sincerely engaged or if they simply 
“went through the motions.” the police also wanted basic information about 
youth within 90 days of referral to scI. whenever there was a possibility that 
the state’s Attorney’s office might want to file charges in a case following 
from a law enforcement 
perSpectIve, It waS 
eSSentIal to track the 
Involvement of each 
youth In JISc-related 
ServIceS and to apprISe 
the State’S attorney’S 
offIce of any caSe In 
whIch a youth refuSed 
to comply wIth JISc 
requIrementS. 
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noncompliance with the JIsc process, that filing had to happen quickly. 
Further, having some details about a youth’s progress could impact future 
processing for youth picking up new charges. For youth arrested on new 
charges, the police should be able to determine how the youth responded to 
any prior diversion opportunities. did the youth actively participate? would it 
be foolish to try diversion again? 
even when the partner agencies could agree on a basic approach to 
information, simple counting problems complicated the issue. cPd and scI 
approached the same data differently. cPd counted each incident separately. 
If a youth was arrested and taken to the JIsc on four separate occasions, cPd 
counted that as four referrals. on the other hand, scI counted youth and not 
criminal incidents. given the same scenario, scI may note the four arrests, 
but their workers would consider the youth as one referral. Because cPd 
maintained all juvenile records citywide, the official performance measures 
for the JIsc used the cPd counts, but the workload measures for the JIsc 
often used the scI count. 
of course, there were numerous coordination problems, from concerns over 
who got access to what information and when, to basic decisions about 
youth identifiers, measuring family involvement, sibling data, and so forth. 
there were many issues with data collection as well. during the early phases 
of the JIsc, scI relied on paper reports for much of its data collection. the 
police department was far more automated and accustomed to having 
greater data resources. cPd collected weekly data, whereas most agencies 
collected and reported monthly numbers.  
due to the efforts of cPd and cYs, the JIsc made considerable progress 
in the development of management information systems during 2008. 
As part of the development of the JIsc, the city began working on an 
integrated data system, known as cityspan, which was to be implemented 
across many city agencies. cPd agreed to enter basic data about each JIsc 
referral into cityspan; scI would then enter data about its case management 
and service delivery efforts in the same system; and from this combined 
database, city officials would be able to run comprehensive reports about 
the characteristics of each case, the youth’s participation in services, and 
relevant case outcomes. Questions remained, of course, about whether the 
information in cityspan was adequate and whether it captured the items 
that would be needed for future evaluation work. the JIsc partner agencies 
continued to have discussions about the design and operation of information 
systems well into 2008.  
even with an integrated information system, there were data elements that 
cPd would not allow scI to see, and there were data elements under the 
control of scI that cPd could not access. the goal of the cityspan system 
was to bring together information from the law enforcement and the social 
services sectors without allowing either side to have complete access to all 
information maintained by the other. For example, scI was willing to share 
summary information about cases but not highly detailed information. cPd 
officers could know whether a youth was progressing satisfactorily through 
the JIsc process, but they might not know exactly which services a youth 
received. similarly, cPd tracked several core data elements for each youth 
referred to the JIsc, but only some of those elements were to be shared 
with outside agencies. city officials believed that an increase in the extent of 
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information exchanged would result in more positive outcomes for youth. 
If cPd were able to use a shared data system to ascertain that a youth was 
already involved with a certain agency, officers might use their discretion to 
continue that service and decline to refer the youth to court immediately.  
the scI staff also worked to improve the reliability of the agency’s 
information. key events about every case involving a JIsc-referred youth 
were tracked using spreadsheets that the scI executive director maintained. 
Reports based on this information could be generated routinely to assess 
whether the agency’s goals were being met and to monitor the status of 
each case. At case closure, the scI spreadsheet would indicate why the case 
was closed (e.g., noncompliance, refusal of service, lack of participation, 
hospitalization, relocation out of service area, or detention). this summary 
information could then be entered into the cityspan database. 
Although it is difficult to assess data systems from a distance (this study did 
not have direct access to any data from agency information systems for this 
project), the data systems used to support JIsc operations appear to be 
growing stronger. through the concerted efforts of the key partner agencies, 
disputes about the proper role of data and information appear to have been 
largely resolved, and the JIsc program may have an adequate base of client 
information with which to begin a formal evaluation of client outcomes.
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conclUsIon |
to many of those involved in chicago’s youth policy environment, bringing 
social services into a close partnership with law enforcement is quite 
innovative. while there is usually broad support for prevention programs 
that serve all youth (e.g., chicago’s “After school matters”), there is often less 
support for programs serving young offenders. one long-time participant 
in city affairs expressed deep concern about the decision-making climate in 
chicago.
 Unfortunately, when we talk about youth, we tend to focus on  
 [primary] prevention programs and having cops in school so kids  
 can see the police. we never talk about the kids who [have already  
 been arrested]; people don’t like to talk about that population.  
 sometimes I see that the opportunity is there, but I don’t know  
 if  people fully comprehend the opportunity. I hate to say this,  
 but I don’t think the [city] administration thinks about   
 kids who are already involved in the juvenile justice system. we, the  
 city, tend to think about kids only in one way—kids who need after- 
 school or summer activities. that’s the only way we think about this  
 … we like to splash around in the shallow end of the pool, but we  
 don’t like to play in the deep end.
the JIsc is decidedly not a police program, but the police were very involved. 
some officials from the chicago Police department viewed the JIsc as a bold 
departure, but others saw it as an extension of already familiar methods. one 
police official pointed out that cPd was always engaged in some level of 
social service and that it had long partnered with people in the community. 
Yet, the same official admitted that there is often an “us/them thing” going 
on in the police department’s interaction with communities. such attitudes 
often complicated efforts to coordinate the procedures of law enforcement 
with the tasks and goals of social services. Another city official asserted 
that, in developing the JIsc, the goal was to respect all parties for their 
unique contribution. “leave law enforcement decisions to law enforcement 
and social service decisions to social service providers. let’s respect the 
judgments of the professionals involved on both the law enforcement side 
and the social service side. we are here to work together.”  
Based on this review of JIsc operations and interviews with the staff and 
leaders of various offices and organizations involved with the JIsc, the 
research team reached a number of conclusions and recommendations about 
the future of the JIsc and the feasibility of conducting a formal outcome 
evaluation of the program. these conclusions and recommendations 
included the following:
PRogRAm desIgn, goVeRnAnce, And stAFFIng 
 >  the JIsc program was developed in a complex environment. key organizational 
partners often held different views about the program’s mission, structure, and 
funding. By 2008, however, there was a clear consensus about the purposes of the 
JIsc and the principal strategies for accomplishing its mission.
 > Among the managers and workers involved in the JIsc, concerns remained about 
the organizational configuration of the program, its potential for unintended 
consequences, the insufficient array of community-based resources available 
for youth and families, and the policies governing data sharing. these concerns 
needed to be identified and addressed by city leaders.  
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> the most serious challenge to the future success of the JIsc was the mixed 
message it sent to the community. the JIsc was designed as a provider of 
diversion services for young and often first-time offenders. Yet the JIsc process 
for youth began inside a police station, where officers are responsible for a wider 
range of offenders, including many youth headed to juvenile court. the security 
environment necessary to handle potentially serious offenders permeated 
the building and affected the demeanor of the staff, thus preventing the full 
development of an effective diversion-oriented culture. 
> to provide effective diversion for youth who are station adjusted and referred to 
case management, the city must find some way to separate them earlier from 
the more security-oriented features of the JIsc process. the physical environment 
and social space experienced by youth at the JIsc should be a central part of the 
program and should reflect and reinforce its guiding philosophy—namely, the 
concepts of restorative justice and positive youth development. 
> to ensure that the JIsc process provided services, supports, and opportunities for 
youth that were consistent with its guiding philosophy, all staff associated with the 
JIsc (whether from cPd, children and Youth services (cYs), the sinai community 
Institute (scI), or any other agency) should be fully, and continuously, trained in 
positive youth development and restorative justice.  
ResoURce IssUes
>  city officials should reexamine their initial plans for the JIsc and restore the 
program to its original goals and purposes—i.e., to provide a broad range of 
services, opportunities, and supports for youth and their families using the guiding 
frameworks of restorative justice and positive youth development. 
>  the agencies involved in the JIsc partnership worked hard to develop resources 
for youth, but the range of these resources still fell short of expectations. 
 
>  the services and resources available to youth were not as comprehensive and 
diverse as needed to fulfill the original vision for the program—namely, to 
approach young offenders and their families from a restorative justice and positive 
youth development perspective. 
 
>  too much responsibility for intervention rested with the scI case management 
staff. the initial vision was that case managers would perform screening, referral, 
and monitoring functions, while interventions and opportunities for youth would 
be implemented by a network of service providers and community organizations, 
both voluntary and contractual. After two years, that network remained 
inadequate. 
  
>  Resources for JIsc youth were constrained by funding shortages but also by the 
limited vision of city leaders, agency officials, and program staff that often looked 
no further than professionalized, reimbursable interventions in their search for 
solutions to the city’s youth crime problem. 
 
>  to build an effective network of services, supports, and opportunities for youth in 
the communities served by the JIsc, the city needed to engage in the protracted 
community organizing necessary to develop the type of volunteer-based 
neighborhood supports suggested by the foundational concepts that led to the 
JIsc.
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dAtA And InFoRmAtIon sYstems 
>  the data systems used to support JIsc operations appeared to be growing 
stronger. Information systems maintained by the chicago Police department, the 
department of children and Youth services, and the sinai community Institute 
appeared to be sufficient for conducting an outcome evaluation of the JIsc. 
>  Before it would be appropriate to evaluate client outcomes, however, the linkages 
between the data systems of cPd, cYs, and the sinai community Institute needed 
to be fully established and tested in an actual, operational context, and the range 
of variables contained in those systems had to be assessed by independent, 
external researchers to determine whether the available information was sufficient 
for a high-quality outcome evaluation. 
AgencY PARtneRsHIPs
> despite long-standing divisions, most of the interagency issues surrounding the 
JIsc were resolved successfully during its first year of operation, due to the strong 
leadership of the JIsc executive director and the persistence of several key officials 
in the chicago department of children and Youth services, the chicago Police 
department, and the mayor’s office. 
 
> the conflicts and differences between the partnering agencies were inevitable due 
to the mission of the JIsc and the position it occupied between the sectors of law 
enforcement and social services. 
  
> Agencies from law enforcement and those from social services always see their 
task environments differently. the organizational culture of a police department 
favors command and control, efficient case processing, individual-level data, and a 
hierarchical approach to decision making. social service agencies operate in a less-
controlled, more turbulent environment in which staff are inadequately trained 
and poorly compensated and often see part of their job as protecting clients from 
a justice system whose motivations they do not completely share or trust. 
 > the continued success of the JIsc depended on effective management of the 
inherent incompatibilities between law enforcement and social services. these 
differences may never be eliminated, but they must be acknowledged and 
managed. 
RecommendAtIons to FAcIlItAte FoRmAl eVAlUAtIon 
 >  the JIsc process must be improved in a number of ways before it would be wise 
for the city of chicago to evaluate its client outcomes in an outcome or impact 
evaluation.
>  the services, supports, and opportunities provided for each JIsc youth should 
be determined by fully developed and truly individualized intervention plans, 
and not be allowed to deteriorate into a one-size-fits-all approach in order to 
accommodate the resource limitations of existing providers. 
 
>  the range of interventions and supports available for JIsc youth must be 
consistent with the restorative justice and youth development frameworks that 
were the original inspiration for the JIsc program model. the resources offered 
initially through the JIsc process were not diverse enough to support the mission. 
 
>  the JIsc must be able to document the exact mix of services, supports, and 
opportunities delivered to program youth during whatever period of time the 
youth successfully participate in JIsc-related activities. 
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>  the record of service delivery activities and program participation by individual 
youth must be stored in a database that draws upon a wide range of key data 
elements available from cPd, cYs, and scI. 
 
> some combination of individual-level outcomes (arrests, court referrals, 
prosecutions, placements, school attendance, and so forth) must be available in 
a consistent fashion for all former JIsc youth through at least the first 12 months 
following case closure, regardless of whether the case was terminated successfully 
or unsuccessfully. 
 > Arrangements must be in place to track the same combination of individual-level 
outcomes (or at least a key subset of those outcomes) among a comparison group 
of youth who are similar to those involved in the JIsc. It must be possible to track 
the outcomes for comparison-group youth for up to 12 months following some 
type of event that is arguably similar to case closure for JIsc youth. 
 
the Juvenile Intervention and support center may have changed the way 
chicago responds to young offenders who commit nonviolent crimes. 
through its efforts to develop and operate the JIsc, the city inspired a new, 
broadly shared philosophy: namely, that the most effective response to 
young offenders does not always require referral to court, prosecution, and 
incarceration. Instead, young offenders can be attached to resources that 
engage them in pro-social activities, positive relationships, and structured 
experiences that prevent future crime and lower their chances of becoming 
more deeply involved in the justice system. After the JIsc program opened 
in 2006, a large number of individuals and agencies in the city of chicago 
worked hard to solidify the new collaborative relationships that made the 
JIsc possible. that work continued even after the first two years of operation. 
Yet, the program appeared to be establishing itself as an innovative diversion 
process for young offenders. 
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